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The theory of quantification and variable binding developed by Tarski is a fixed 
point for many debates in metaphysics, formal semantics, and philosophy of 
logic. However, recent critics—most forcefully, Kit Fine (2003, 2007)—have 
posed an intriguing set of challenges to Tarskiǯs account, which re-expose long 
sublimated anxieties about the variable from the infancy of analytic philosophy.  
 
The problem is a version of a puzzle confronted by Russell, which Fine dubs the ǲantimony of the variableǳ. This paradox arises from seemingly contradictory 
things that we wish to say about the variable. On the one hand, there are strong reasons to deny that Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ are synonymous, since they make different 
contributions when they jointly occur within a sentence. Consider, for instance, the sentence Ǯ∃ݔ∃ݕ ݔ ≤ ݕǯ. One cannot replace the second occurrence of Ǯxǯ with Ǯyǯ ȋyielding Ǯ∃ݔ∃ݕ ݕ ≤ ݕǯȌ without change of meaning. On the other hand, there is 
a strong temptation to say that distinct variables Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ are synonymous, 
since sentences differing by the total, proper substitution of Ǯxǯ for Ǯyǯ always 
agree in meaning. For instance, Ǯ∀ݔ ݔ ≤ ݔǯ and Ǯ∀ݕ ݕ ≤ ݕǯ are synonymous in the 
strongest possible sense. As Fine says, they are mere ǲnotational variantsǳ. We 
suggest that it is best to construe this very strong synonymy as an identity in 
structured meanings: the sentences and their corresponding parts are 
synonymous all the way down. This suggests that the variables occurring in 
corresponding positions in these formulas are also synonymous.  
 One of the innovations of Tarskiǯs (1935) semantics is that a variable refers to or 
designates an object only relative to a sequence. One might hope that this goes 
some way towards resolving the antinomy, since Tarski need not assign any sort 
of referent to the variable. But this is not enough, since the antinomy concerns 
whether two variables are synonymous. As we formulate the antinomy, it concerns the variableǯs contribution to the structured meaning of a sentence that 
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contains it. Even on Tarskiǯs sequence-relative semantics, Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ may 
designate different individuals even relative to the same sequence.  This suggests 
that their meanings are different. But this leaves Tarski unable to account for the 
felt sameness of meaning between distinct but corresponding variables in 
alphabetic variants. 
 
These challenges would overturn seemingly settled doctrines about the 
relationship between language and the world. A dramatic reconceptualization of 
the role of variables in mathematical practice, in natural language semantics, and 
even in first-order logic would be called for. Fine suggests ǲsemantic relationismǳ, 
a radical departure from standard compositional semantics.  
 (owever, Tarskiǯs semantics for variables has the resources to resolve the 
antinomy without abandoning standard compositional semantics. In a neglected 
passage, Tarski worried about how to determine the value of a variable relative 
to a sequence. He suggests that, in a given sentence, the first variable should be 
associated with the first position, the second variable with the second position, 
and so on. Using a bit of dynamic semantics, we develop this suggestion into a 
rigorous procedure—which we call dynamic indexing—associating each variable 
with a position in a sequence. The underlying idea is that the semantic 
contribution of a variable maps a context to a position in a sequence. On the semantics we offer, Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ will be associated with distinct functions from 
contexts into positions in sequences. Nonetheless, if Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ occur in 
corresponding positions in sentences that are alphabetic variants, then (in 
context) they will be correlated with the same position in a sequence. Thus, we offer a sense in which Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ have the same semantic role and a sense in which they donǯt, thereby resolving the antinomy. 
 
 
1. The antinomy of the variable 
 
Variables are central to the notation of mathematics and science. Some 
mathematical and scientific claims are framed using ǲfreeǳ variables. A 
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mathematician might express the claim that an operator such as Ǯ+ǯ is 
commutative using the ǲopenǳ formula Ǯݔ + ݕ = ݕ + ݔǯ. Free variables are of 
limited use in expressing generality, however, since one cannot express 
embedded general claims such as negated universal or multiply quantified 
statements.  
 
For instance, sentence (1) could in principle be rewritten using only free 
variables. Sentence (2) requires more sophisticated symbolism. 
 
(1) Every number is less than or equal to itself.  
(2) Every number is less than or equal to some number.  
 
For this reason, both sentence (1) and (at least one reading of) sentence (2) are regimented using ǲboundǳ variables, which fall under the scope of quantifiers such as Ǯfor everyǯ ȋǮ∀ǯȌ and Ǯfor someǯ ȋǮ∃ǯȌ. 
 
(1*) ∀ݔ ݔ ≤ ݔ    
(2*) ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤ ݕ 
 
Writing quantified sentences using variables resolves ambiguities and facilitates 
inference because it wears its compositional structure on its sleeve. In particular, 
the meaning of the complex expression in this notation is determined by the 
meanings of its syntactic constituents and their order of combination. That is, 
meaning is compositional.  Compositionality helps explain why speakers can 
grasp the infinitely many sentences of a language. It also constrains the choice of 
semantic theories, making them more susceptible to empirical disconfirmation. 
 
In contrast to the quantified sentences of formal languages, semanticists 
commonly derive the semantic features of a quantified sentence from natural 
language—such as (1)—by first regimenting it. Often, they posit a ǲdeeperǳ level 
of representation, which captures the ǲlogical formǳ. For example, contemporary 
linguists provide a syntactic story whereby the quantifier ǲmovesǳ out front and 
leaves behind a ǲtraceǳ. The trace is treated as a bound variable (Heim and 
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Kratzer 1998: 178–200). In this way, the syntactic structure—e.g. of (1*)—more 
directly tracks its semantic evaluation. 
But what is the syntactic structure of sentences (1*) and (2*)? The standard 
answer since Tarski (1935) is as follows. In constructing (1*), one starts with the variable Ǯxǯ and the two-place predicate Ǯ≤ǯ to build the ǲopen sentenceǳ Ǯݔ ≤  ݔǯ.1 
One then prefixes the quantifier Ǯ∀ݔǯ yielding Ǯ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݔǯ. Sentence (2*) is 
constructed similarly. We start with the variables Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ and the two-place predicate Ǯ≤ǯ to build the open sentence Ǯݔ ≤  ݕǯ, then prefix Ǯ∀ݔǯ to yield Ǯ∀ݔ ݔ ≤ ݕǯ. Finally, one attaches Ǯ∃ݕǯ resulting in Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ. So, this standard 
account presupposes what we will call assumption (): Variables are genuine 
syntactic constituents of quantified sentences.  
 
Some approaches to the semantics of quantification dispense with assumption 
(), and reject the view that variables have an independent semantic role.2 We 
will address one of these arising from the Fregean tradition. But we will leave 
other approaches—such as combinatory logic—for future discussion. 
 
Assuming that a variable is a genuine constituent of a sentence, it must have 
some meaning or what Fine (2007: 7) calls a ǲsemantic roleǳ or ǲlinguistic functionǳ.  )t is the job of semantics to describe this meaning.   
 The antinomy of the variable concerns whether two variables, Ǯݔǯ and Ǯݕǯ, agree in 
meaning. The difficulty is—as Fine (2007: 7) puts it—ǲwe wish to say contradictory things about their semantic roleǳ. The conflict arises because two 
variables occurring in the same sentence seem to behave differently, but 
occurring in different sentences their behavior is indistinguishable.3 
                                                        
1 Tarski was the first to clearly argue that open sentences belong in the same grammatical 
category as closed sentence. His argument was that the same operators—negation, conjunction, 
and so on—could attach to both open and closed sentences (Tarski 1935: 189-91; Tarski 1941: 4-
5).  
2 In natural language semantics the roles of quantification and variable-binding are sometime 
separated. The latter job is done by -binders, which attach to open sentences that contain 
variables. It follows that variables are still genuine constituents of a sentence. 
3 Fine ȋʹͲͲ͹: ͻȌ does not rest content with this form of the paradox. (e asks what it means for Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ to have different semantic roles in a context. (e answers that the pairs of variables Ǯxǯ, Ǯyǯ and Ǯxǯ, Ǯxǯ make different contributions to whatever sentences contain them. Since Fineǯs 
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Difference: When variables Ǯݔǯ and Ǯݕǯ jointly occur in a single 
sentence, they have distinct meanings. 
 
Sameness: In sentences that differ in the total, proper substitution of Ǯݔǯ for Ǯݕǯ, these variables have the 
same meanings. 
 
In what follows, we offer arguments purporting to show that two variables must 
have these conflicting features, by making explicit the underlying theoretical 
motivations for ascribing each feature to variables. 
 
 
1.ͷ Why Ǯݔǯ and Ǯݕǯ must not agree in meaning 
 The argument that Ǯݔǯ and Ǯݕǯ have different meaning is straightforward, since 
substituting one for the other may fail to preserve meaning. Fine (2003: 606) 
appeals to open sentences containing free variables to make the argument: 
Suppose that we have two variables, say Ǯݔǯ and Ǯݕǯ;… [W]hen we consider 
the semantic role of the variables in the same expression—such as Ǯݔ >  ݕǯ—then it seems…clear that their semantic role is different. Indeed, 
it is essential to the linguistic function of the expression as a whole that it 
contains two distinct variables, not two occurrences of the same variable, 
and presumably this is because the roles of the distinct variables are not 
the same. 
 Fineǯs crucial premise is that expressions differing only by the substitution of one 
occurrence of a variable for an occurrence of the other differ in meaning. In Fineǯs example, the occurrence of Ǯxǯ in the open sentence Ǯݔ >  ݕǯ cannot be 
substituted with Ǯyǯ—yielding Ǯݕ >  ݕǯ—without change of meaning.  
 
The argument implicitly appeals to the principle of compositionality, that the 
semantic features of a whole are determined by the semantic features of their parts and their mode of combination. )n particular, if Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ had exactly the 
                                                                                                                                                              opponents donǯt offer any semantic characterization of pairs of expressions, we will leave the 
antinomy as it stands. 
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same semantic features, then, replacing the first occurrence of Ǯxǯ with Ǯyǯ in Ǯݔ >  ݕǯ should yield a sentence with the same meaning. But it does not. 
 While intuitive, some may object to Fineǯs appeal to the meanings of open 
sentences.  One might doubt whether one has direct access to whether the open sentences Ǯݔ > ݕǯ and Ǯݕ > ݕǯ agree in meaning. The case could therefore be 
strengthened if it can be established that replacing Ǯxǯ with Ǯyǯ in a closed 
sentence does not preserve meaning. This can be directly verified by considering the fact that Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݕ ≤ ݕǯ and Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݕ ≤ ݔǯ differ in meaning—indeed they may 
differ in truth-value, though they differ only by replacing an occurrence of Ǯxǯ with Ǯyǯ. )t follows from the principle of compositionality that the variables Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ differ in meaning. 
 
 
1.2 Why Ǯݔǯ and Ǯݕǯ must agree in meaning 
 Fineǯs (2003, 606) argument that Ǯݔǯ and Ǯݕǯ must agree in meaning is elusive: 
Suppose that we have two variables, say Ǯݔǯ and Ǯݕǯ; …[W]hen we consider 
their semantic role in two distinct expressions—such as Ǯݔ >  Ͳǯ and Ǯݕ >  Ͳǯ, we wish to say that their semantic role is the same. Indeed, this 
would appear to be as clear a case as any of a mere ǲconventionalǳ or ǲnotationalǳ difference; the difference is merely in the choice of the 
symbol and not in its linguistic function. 
 Undoubtedly, Fine is right that the choice between Ǯݔ >  Ͳǯ and Ǯݕ >  Ͳǯ is purely 
notational, and thus their ǲmeaningsǳ must have something in common. But Fine doesnǯt elucidate the theoretical importance of this commonality. The claim that Ǯݔǯ and Ǯݕǯ agree in meaning (in some important sense) is crucial to Fineǯs whole 
project. Without it, there simply is no antinomy. So it is desirable to find some 
more robust theoretical motivation for the claim.  
 
Such a motivation can be found by appealing to a strong notion of synonymy 
recognized within the formal semantics tradition. This tradition aims at 
specifying the truth conditions of a sentence in terms of the compositional 
semantic values of its constituents (Lewis 1970; Montague 1974). The truth 
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conditions of a sentence will be specified as the set of points of evaluation (e.g. 
sets of possible worlds) in which the sentence is true. The problem is that, even 
within the formal semantics tradition, truth conditions are recognized as rather 
too coarse-grained to serve as the meanings of sentences. For instance, assuming 
all mathematical theorems are necessary, any two theorems ȋsuch as Ǯthere are infinitely many prime numbersǯ and Ǯtwo is primeǯ) are truth conditionally 
equivalent. But any view counting these sentences as wholly synonymous is 
missing something.4 
 
This problem is standardly addressed by identifying the meaning of a sentence 
not merely with its compositional semantic value, but also with the procedure by 
which the compositional semantic value was derived from the meanings of the 
sentenceǯs ultimate constituents. Let us call this, the sentenceǯs structured 
meaning. When the antinomy is construed in terms of structured meanings, it 
derives its force from the conjunction of assumption () which states that 
variables are genuine constituents of sentences which contain them with an additional assumption linking a sentenceǯs syntactic constituents to the 
constituents of its structured meaning. We call this assumption (). 
() Variables are genuine syntactic constituents of quantified and 
open sentences of the regimented language. 
() Each syntactic constituent of a sentence of a regimented language 
must correspond to a constituent of the structured meaning of that 
sentence. 
Assumption () traces back to Carnapǯs ȋͳͻͶ͹) strongest notion of synonymy, ǲintensional isomorphismǳ, which requires that the parts of synonymous 
sentences agree in meaning.5  
 
                                                        
4 If one thinks that mathematical theorems are contingent—for instance, because one thinks that 
the existence of mathematical entities is contingent—then the example can easily be altered to 
our purposes. See the discussion in Heim and Kratzer (1998: §12.4). 
5 Carnap (1947) cites C. I. Lewis (1943) as a predecessor, but says that their views developed 
independently. 
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For similar reasons, Stalnaker (2003: 65) speaks of the meaning of a sentence as ǲthe recipe for determining its truth-conditions as a function of the meanings of its components and the compositional rulesǳ. As Lewis (1970: 31) says,  
Differences in intension, we may say, give us coarse differences in 
meaning. For fine differences in meaning we must look to the analysis of a 
compound into constituents and to the intensions of the several constituents. … For still finer differences in meaning we must look in turn 
to the intensions of constituents of constituents, and so on. Only when we 
come to non-compound, lexical constituents can we take sameness of 
intension as a sufficient condition of synonymy.  
 
 
In addition to providing a grip on the pre-theoretic notion of synonymy, 
structured meanings have been put to work in developing an account of the 
information value or belief content of a sentence, which can solve puzzles 
associated with propositional attitude ascriptions. Thus, Carnap (1947: §13), 
followed by many others, argued that belief ascriptions are neither extensional 
nor intensional since they do not even permit the substitution of intensionally 
equivalent sentences. Although Ǯthere are infinitely many primesǯ has the same intension as Ǯʹ+ʹ=Ͷǯ, the belief ascriptions ǮSam believes that there are infinitely many primesǯ and ǮSam believes that ʹ+ʹ=Ͷǯ may differ in truth-value.  
 Fineǯs claim that Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ agree in meaning can be bolstered by framing it in 
terms of structured meanings. One corollary of assumption () is that if two 
sentences are synonymous in the relevant sense, then they must have 
corresponding constituents which agree in meaning. That is, if � and � are 
synonymous (i.e. have the same structured meaning), then each component ߙ of � must agree in meaning—in the relevant sense—with its counterpart ߚ of �. 
 
The problem now is that formulae that result from the total, proper substitution 
of one variable Ǯxǯ for another Ǯyǯ are synonymous in the strongest sense.6 
Consider two regimentations of sentence (1). We regimented this sentence as 
                                                        
6 Church (1956 p. 40 fn. 96Ȍ says: ǲ…[an expression] which contains a particular variable as a 
bound variable is unaltered in meaning by alphabetic change of the variable, at all of its bound 
occurrences, to a new variable (not previously occurring) which has the same range.ǳ See Kalish 
and Montague (1964, Chapter 7) for an explicit definition of uniform substitution and alphabetic 
variants.  
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Ǯ∀ݔ ݔ ≤ ݔǯ, but Ǯ∀ݕ ݕ ≤  ݕǯ is an equally good regimentation of (1). Indeed, one would read both of these aloud as Ǯevery number is less than or equal to itselfǯ. 
The fact that alphabetic variants such as Ǯ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݔǯ and Ǯ∀ݕ ݕ ≤  ݕǯ regiment the 
same natural language sentence suggests that they are synonymous.7  
 
Some semanticists such as Jacobson (1999: 127) have been so gripped by the 
synonymy of alphabetic variants, that they have abandoned the use of variables in natural language semantics as somehow a ǲcheatǳ:  
If the variable names such as ݔଵ and ݔଶ (or, 1 and 2) are actual model-
theoretic objects, then they are of course distinct objects. And yet, when 
they find themselves in forms which are alphabetic variants, they never 
make a different semantic contribution… In other words, there is an 
obvious sense in which ݔଵ  and ݔଶ  really are not different semantic 
objects—unlike other distinct model-theoretic objects. 
 
To avoid this antinomy, Jacobson herself offers a radical semantic proposal for 
avoiding variables in her semantics. 8 
 
Another manifestation of this synonymy arises because alphabetic variants seem 
to express exactly the same belief content. This is reflected in the fact that 
alphabetic variants are intersubstitutable even in propositional attitude reports.9  
Consider sentence (3). 
 
(3) John believes that every number is less than or equal to itself.  
 ȋ͵Ȍ is equally well regimented by ǮJohn believes that ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݔǯ and ǮJohn 
believes that ∀ݕ ݕ ≤  ݕǯ. But, if so, then the structured content expressed by the 
regimentations of the embedded sentences in context must agree in meaning. 
                                                        
7 Related arguments occur in Kalish and Montague (1964: 165). If, like Quine (1960), one thinks 
that regimentation need not preserve meaning, then one will be inclined to reject this argument. 
See also, e.g. Church (1956: 20) and Lewis (1970: 45-46). 
8 Related skepticism about variables has also led logicians such as Curry and Feys (1958/1968) 
to develop alternative variable-free systems. See the notation developed in De Bruijn (1972) for a 
different approach. Simply getting rid of variables in the syntax doesnǯt automatically get one off 
the hook with respect to the general problems concerning the structured meaning of quantified 
sentences. Given that such systems trade variables in the syntax for an array of combinators in 
the syntax one might worry that analogous problems will re-emerge.  
9 The total, proper substitution of bound variables preserves sense even on Churchǯs ȋͳͻͷͳ: ͷ, 
footnote 5) Alternative (0)—his strictest criterion of synonymy, which is meant to model attitude 
ascriptions. See also Kaplan (1989a: 557) 
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Thus, sentences differing only by the total, proper substitution of variables look 
synonymous in the strongest possible sense. They are mere notational variants, 
if any sentences are at all.10 Thus, their corresponding parts must agree in 
meaning: Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ must agree in meaning. 
 
 
1.3 The challenge of the antinomy 
 We have uncovered that Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ must—in some sense—agree in meaning, but 
also that they must—in some sense—disagree in meaning. Both Carnap (1947: 
58-59) and Lewis (1970: 45-46) recognized this tension. They wanted to 
guarantee that alphabetic variants have the same structured meanings. Yet, on 
their explicit semantics, distinct variables have distinct semantic values due to 
the constraints of compositionality, giving rise to what Lewis called a ǲspurious ambiguityǳ between alphabetic variants such as Ǯ∀ݔ ݔ ≤ ݔǯ and Ǯ∀ݕ ݕ ≤ ݕǯ.  
 
Both Carnap (1947: 58-59) and Lewis (1970: 45-46) introduced artificial, ad hoc 
maneuvers to relieve this tension and thereby identify the structured meanings 
of alphabetic variants, even though the corresponding constituents had different 
semantic values. This type of ad hoc trick undermines the motivation for 
appealing to structured meanings in the first place.  
 
Other proponents of structured contents have been at pains to avoid the 
antinomy. The basic idea behind the structured contents approach is that a sentence has a content which ǲencodes, or is composed out of, the meanings of [the sentenceǯs] constituentsǳ ȋSoames ʹͲͳͲ: ͳͳʹȌ. One sort of solution adopted 
by prominent proponents of structured contents approaches—including 
                                                        
10  On Cresswellǯs ȋͳͻͺͷ: ͳͲʹff) structured meanings approach, a sentence �  of arbitrary 
complexity can be embedded in the that-clause of a belief report. The Ǯthatǯ operator is 
polysemous and can operate either on � or on the separate parts of � taken in sequence. In the 
latter case, the object of belief will be the structured meaning of �, which is identified with the 
ordered n-tuple of the intensions of �ǯs constituents. Cresswell  ȋibid: 101) does not actually 
specify intensions for variables, but only intensions relative to an assignment. As a result, his procedure either fails to deliver structured meanings for Ǯ∃�ݔܨݔǯ and Ǯ∃�ݕܨݕǯ or—if the 
semantics for variables is naturally extended to provide them intensions—will assign these 
sentences different structured meanings, delivering the unwelcome result that they may embed 
differently under belief ascription.  
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(Salmon 1986: 145-6, theses 27 and 28) and (Soames 1988: 224, thesis 28d)—
involves outright denying that the structured meaning of a quantified sentence 
reflects the meanings of its ultimate components, thereby denying assumption 
(). In particular, according to Soames and Salmon the structured proposition expressed by a quantified sentence such as Ǯ∃ݔܨݔǯ reflects only the meanings of the quantifier Ǯ∃ǯ and the predicate abstract, which we will write as Ǯ̂ݔܨݔǯ. )f we use brackets Ǯ[…]ǯ to denote the contribution an expression makes to the 
structured meaning of a sentence that contains it, then we could display the structured meaning of  Ǯ∃ݔܨݔǯ as follows: 
 
 
The semantic contribution of the predicate abstract Ǯ̂ݔܨݔǯ is not broken down any 
further. This has the result that the sentence expresses the same structured 
meaning as its alphabetic variants such as Ǯ∃ݕܨݕǯ: 
 
 
As a result, this approach might be used to vindicate a broadly Tarskian 
semantics.  
 
Nonetheless, one might offer three interrelated complaints. First, the approach 
requires one to intensionalize the contribution of the predicate abstracts so that 
they reflect the semantic values of some, but not all, of their constituent 
expressions (Fine 2007: 16-17).  This intensionality will be necessary to distinguish the structured content of Ǯ∃ݔܨݔǯ from that of, e.g., Ǯ∃ݔሺܨݔ ש ݔ = ݔሻǯ.  
This leads to the second complaint. Namely, the approach undermines some of 
the original motivations for structured contents. The structured content of, say, Ǯ ∃ݔ ܮ݋ݒ݁�ሺ�݁�݀݁݉݋݊ܽ, ݔሻ ǯ will not contain the structured content of ǮDesdemonaǯ, but will encode it only in an indirect way.11 The third complaint is 
                                                        
11  An advocate of structured propositions might worry that this opens the door to a 
generalization, which accounts for belief content and synonymy in terms of hyperintensional, but 
unstructured meanings as in Church (1951) and Bealer (1982). 
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that the solution seemingly entails that the meanings of some constituent 
expressions are not even encoded in the structured contents of sentences that 
express them. In particular, if the meaning of Ǯxǯ is encoded in the structured 
content of Ǯ∃ݔܨݔǯ and the meaning of Ǯyǯ is encoded in the meaning of Ǯ∃ݕܨݕǯ, then 
the meanings of Ǯxǯ and of Ǯyǯ would need to be the same. But it is hard to see how 
this is compatible with the fact that the meaning of Ǯxǯ differs from the meaning of Ǯyǯ in Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݕ ≤  ݔǯ. If we take the encoding talk seriously, then the antinomy 
seems to recur at the level of what is encoded rather than contained in the 
structured content of a sentence. 
 
More recently, Jeff Kingǯs (1995: 527-9) account of structured contents has 
attempted to do justice to the idea that all of the meaningful syntactic 
constituents of a sentence are encoded in the structured contents they express. 
As a result, he has oscillated in trying to adequately capture the distinct 
contributions of distinct variables in a sentence and at the same time ensure that 
alphabetic variants have the same structured contents.  This oscillation perfectly 
reveals the tensions created by the antinomy of the variable. 
 
In his early work, King (1995: 533-4, notes 5, 20, and 22; 1996: 498) suggested 
that distinct variables must make distinct contributions to the structured 
contents of sentences that contain them. On his official implementation, the 
variables contribute themselves to the structured meanings, though King allows that the variables may be replaced by suitable proxy objects ǲso long as each variable contributes a different oneǳ  ȋKing ͳͻͻͷ: footnote ʹʹȌ. This semantics 
has the result that alphabetic variants, since they may contain distinct variables, 
express different structured contents.12  
 
In more recent work, King (2007: 41-2, 218-222) abandons the view that 
variables contribute anything at all to the structured contents of sentences that 
contain them. Each variable contributes a mere gap or an ǲempty argument positionǳ. But this makes it difficult to see how Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݕ ≤  ݕǯ and Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݕ ≤  ݔǯ 
                                                        
12 The same problem will plague theories that appeal to ǲlinguistic modes of presentationǳ such 
as the Interpreted Logic Forms of Larson and Ludlow (1993Ȍ, since ǲ[)LFs] include complete 
syntactic phrase-markers, including diacritics (e.g., variables and indicesȌǳ (349, note 29). 
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can have different structured meanings. In particular, the semantic values of the 
simple constituents of these sentences make the same contributions to their 
structured meanings.13    
 
On our way of viewing the antinomy, it challenges us to articulate a sense in 
which alphabetic variants are synonymous—have the same structural 
meanings—despite the fact that the variables Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ exhibit different semantic 
behavior, and thus have different semantic values. 
 
 
2. Are There Variables?  
 
Problems with variables and ǲthe symbolism of generalityǳ have a long history in 
analytic philosophy. For instance, in Principia, Whitehead and Russell observed 
that distinct variables make different contributions within the context of a single 
larger sentence.14 Thus, Ǯx is hurtǯ and Ǯy is hurtǯ make distinct contributions in Ǯx 
is hurt and y is hurtǯ. On the other hand, the content of these open sentences 
express the same ǲpropositional functionǳ.  
Accordingly though ǲx is hurtǳ and ǲy is hurtǳ occurring in the same 
context can be distinguished, ǲ̂ݔ is hurt" and ǲ̂ݕ is hurtǳ convey no 
distinction of meaning at all. (Whitehead and Russell 1910: 15) 
 
Similarly, they hold that quantified sentences that are alphabetic variants 
express the same proposition, or structured content. The symbol Ǯሺݔሻ. �ݔǯ denotes one definite proposition, and there is no 
distinction in meaning between  Ǯሺݔሻ. �ݔǯ and  Ǯሺݕሻ. �ݕǯ when they occur in 
the same context.   (Whitehead and Russell 1910: 16) 
 
                                                        
13 Kingǯs ȋʹͲͲ͹Ȍ view is best understood as embracing a kind of non-compositionality (analogous 
to that of Fine 2003) so that the contributions of non-terminal nodes to structured meanings of 
sentences that contain them are not determined by the contributions of their simpler 
components (see footnote 31 below). Yli-Vakkuri (2013: §3.3.2Ȍ charges that Kingǯs semantics is 
non-compositional, but in a different sense. Yli-Vakkuri argues that Kingǯs semantics violates the 
naïve view that the structured content of a sentence in context is its compositional semantic 
value, so that substituting two sentences with the same structured meanings results in a 
sentence with the same structured meaning. We reject this naïve assumption and it plays no part 
in our argument.  
14 Russell ȋͳͻͲͷ: ͶͺͲȌ assumes variables are ǲfundamentalǳ, which seems to validate assumption 
(). See Russell (1903: §86-93) and Frege (1904) for further early discussion of the anitonomy. 
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Thus, there is an important sense in which Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ agree in meaning, though 
not when occurring in the same context.15 
 
Despite its august roots, we suspect that many philosophers will feel little 
patience with the antinomy because it rests on assumption (), that variables are 
genuine syntactic constituents of sentences.  Indeed, there is an important 
semantic tradition originating with Frege rejecting assumption (Ȍ. Fregeǯs 
suspicions about variables issued from considerations resembling the antinomy 
of the variable. Frege reasons that if variables are genuine constituents of 
sentences, then two variables must have the same reference (and perhaps 
express the same sense).16   
We cannot specify what properties x has and what differing properties y 
has. If we associate anything with these letters at all, it is the same vague 
image for both of them. (Frege 1904: 109) 
 
Since identifying the referents of Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ leads to violations of the principle of 
compositionality, Frege rejects assumption (). 
 Fregeǯs alternative is that bound variables are ultimately typographic parts of the 
dispersed quantifier sign. Frege has been followed by contemporary logicians 
such as Kaplan (1986: 244) who says:17 
Variables serve only to mark places for distant quantifiers to control and 
to serve as a channel for the placement of values. We need no variables. 
We could permit gaping formulas (as Frege would have had it) and use 
wiring diagrams to link the quantifier to its gaps and to channel in values. 
 
   
 
Variables are simply a way of giving the distant quantifiers wireless 
remote control over the gaps.   
 
                                                        
15 Wittgenstein (1922) also grappled with the antimony. See his comments in 4.04 regarding the 
picture theory and the problem of ǲmathematical multiplicityǳ ȋsee especially 4.0411).  
16 Frege (1893: §28) announces as a ǲleading principleǳ that every well-formed name of his language is to denote something. )n this period every expression of Fregeǯs language is a ǲnameǳ.  
17 Cf. Quine (1940: 69-70). 
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On this view, variables are typographic parts of the quantifier sign serving only to link the quantifier to the ǲopenǳ spaces in predicates. 
 
 
2.1 The Fregean semantics 
 
Frege thought of first-level predicates as incomplete, or as containing ǲgapsǳ 
which must be saturated by proper names. 18  Quantifiers, in turn, are 
unsaturated, but at a higher level. Their gaps must be saturated by monadic first-
level predicates. This renders variables mere typographic parts of the quantifier 
sign. However, it would be hasty to infer from this that Fregean approaches are 
immunized against the antinomy of the variable. Russell shows in an appendix to 
The Principles of Mathematics that there is a syntactic variant of the antinomy of 
the variable that afflicts even Fregean approaches. Because of the prominence of 
Fregean approaches in the literature, we will briefly rehearse the Fregean view of quantification and Russellǯs objection.19 
 On Fregeǯs view, predicates result from ǲremovingǳ occurrences of a name from a 
sentence. This is the source of their ǲgapsǳ. For instance, beginning with the 
sentence Ǯ7 ≤ 7ǯ, one can remove the first, the second, or both occurrences of Ǯ͹ǯ 
to yield the predicates Ǯȋ Ȍ ≤ 7ǯ, Ǯ7 ≤ ( Ȍǯ, and Ǯȋ Ȍ ≤ ȋ Ȍǯ, respectively. In the third 
predicate the gaps must be seen as being filled by the same argument. 
  Fregeǯs universal quantifier is a second-level predicate of monadic first-level 
predicates. It includes all occurrences of the ǲvariableǳ that it binds. Updating for 
notation, he might write the universal quantifier as Ǯ∀ݔ … ݔ …ǯ, where Ǯ…ǯ can be 
completed only by the name of a monadic predicate.20 Quantified formulae such 
                                                        
18 Our discussion will focus only on the special case of predicates rather than function names in 
general.  
19 Fine (2007), pp. 16-18 offers his own objections to the Fregean account. The first follows Resnik ȋͳͻͺ͸: ͳͺʹȌ, in arguing that Fregeǯs semantics must be intensional, even at the level of 
reference. The second charges that Fregean theories of quantification entail that quantified 
sentences exhibit an unwelcome dependence on their instances.  
20 Frege (1893: §8) is explicit that the mark corresponding to the bound variable cannot occur 
except when prefixed by a quantifier and that a quantifier must attach to an expression 
containing a mark corresponding to a bound variable on the standard syntax. Although Frege 
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as Ǯ∀ݔ ݔ ≤ 7ǯ, Ǯ∀ݔ 7 ≤ ݔǯ, and Ǯ∀ݔ ݔ ≤ ݔǯ result from saturating the quantifier sign Ǯx…x…ǯ with the monadic predicates such as Ǯȋ Ȍ ≤ 7ǯ, Ǯ7 ≤ ȋ Ȍǯ, and Ǯȋ Ȍ ≤ ( )ǯ, 
respectively. 
 
 
2.2 Russellǯs application of the antinomy 
 
We now have enough of a sketch of the Fregean semantics for quantification on 
the table in order to see why it too is subject to a variant antinomy of the 
variable. In particular, recall the syntactic derivation of (1*) Ǯ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݔǯ   on the 
Fregean approach. An expression with two gaps, namely Ǯȋ Ȍ ≤ ( )ǯ, which is a 
dyadic predicate.21 A single name, such as Ǯ͹ǯ may saturate both these gaps, resulting in a sentence, Ǯ7 ≤ 7ǯ. Then both occurrences of this name may be 
removed from the sentence to yield a monadic predicate Ǯȋ Ȍ ≤ ( )ǯ, which is inserted as an argument into the quantifier Ǯ∀ݔ … ݔ …ǯ, which takes only monadic 
predicates. 
 
The problem is immediately apparent. Nothing in the expressions distinguishes 
the dyadic predicate Ǯȋ ) ≤ ( )ǯ from the monadic predicate Ǯȋ Ȍ ≤ ( )ǯ, which results 
from removing two occurrences of Ǯ͹ǯ from Ǯ7 ≤ 7ǯ. This is the source of Russellǯs 
objection, which he frames in terms of function-names. 
Frege wishes to have the empty places where the argument is to be 
inserted indicated in some way; thus he says that in ʹݔଷ + ݔ the function 
is 2( )3 + ( ). But here his requirement that the two empty places are to be 
filled by the same letter cannot be indicated: there is no way of 
distinguishing what we mean from the function involved in ʹݔଷ + ݕ. 
(Russell 1903: §482) 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
rejects assumption () and prefers to avoid talk of ǲvariablesǳ, he still has to typographically 
differentiate various occurrences of the quantifier sign, e.g. Ǯx…x…ǯ versus Ǯy…y…ǯ. Rule 2 
mandates that in forming an expression of generality one must choose a new German 
letter: Frege remarks, ǲone German letter is in general as good as any other, with the restriction, 
however, that the distinctness of these letters can be essential" (1893: §8). (In Frege's notation 
German letters adorn the quantifier sign, the concavity, and link the quantifier to the ǲopenǳ 
spaces in the relevant predicates.) 
21 This dyadic predicate is required to form sentences such as Ǯ͹≤ͳʹǯ. The discussion in this section is modeled on Fregeǯs ȋͳͺͻ͵, §ʹͻȌ syntactic derivation of Ǯ∀ݔ ݔ = ݔǯ. 
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The worry is that if Frege were to introduce marks capable of typographically 
distinguishing between these predicates, then that mark would need its own 
semantic significance, which in this context means designation.22  
 
The problem with conceiving of predicates as expressions with gaps is that 
nothing distinguishes between an expression with one gap and one with two 
gaps. On Fregeǯs view, gaps are to be conceived of as omissions of names from sentences.  )n the dyadic predicate Ǯȋ Ȍ ≤ ( )ǯ, the two gaps must be capable of 
being saturated by different proper names. Thus they must have different 
semantic import. Yet, there is literally nothing corresponding to either gap. 
There is no sense to be made of the gaps being the same or different. Both gaps 
are merely gaps, there remains no constituent capable of delivering the requisite 
difference in semantic import. Thus, the antinomy of the variable has been 
syntacticized.  
 Of course, we donǯt take these considerations alone to have refuted the Fregean 
approach.23 But they do provide sufficient reason to take variables seriously as 
linguistic units. Indeed, contemporary semanticists, though they take inspiration 
from Frege, do not follow him in rejecting assumption ().24 
 
 
3. Tarski and the antinomy 
 
There is good reason to admit variables as constituents of quantified and open 
sentences. As Tarski (1935: 189) showed, quantifiers operate on sentences just 
as do conjunction and negation. Importantly, they can attach to formulae with 
arbitrary numbers of free-variables. For this reason, Tarski built a syntax in 
which variables occur in the same positions as proper names.  
 
                                                        
22 Frege (1893: §1) introduces the Greek letters Ǯǯ and Ǯǯ to mark the argument places of 
functions. However, he is clear that these are not part of the official symbolism, but occur only in ǲelucidationsǳ. See especially footnote ͳͲ. 
23 For further criticism of the Fregean syntax, see Pickel (2010). 
24 See, e.g., Montague (1973: 250, category BT; 258, clause (2)) and Heim and Kratzer (1998: 
§5.5.5). 
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͹.ͷ Tarskiǯs semantics 
 
 The language he considered includes a set of variables and n-ary predicates. 25 
 
 Variables:  ݔ, ݕ, ݖ, … 
    
Predicates:  ܨ�, ܩ�, ܪ�, … 
 
Variables combine with predicates to form open sentences. These can be 
combined with further operators to form more complex sentences. 
 
Formation rules: 
 If � is an n-ary predicate and ߙଵ, … , ߙ� are variables, then �ߙଵ … ߙ�  
is a formula. 
 
 If � and � are formulae and ߙ is a variable, then � ר �, , ∀ߙ�, 
and ∃ߙ� are formulae. 
 
In contrast to Fregeǯs semantics, quantified sentences result from embedding an 
open sentence under a quantifier just as they appear to. Tarskiǯs semantics 
thereby validates assumption () in the above argument for the antinomy: 
variables are genuine constituents of sentences that contain them, occurring in 
exactly the same positions as proper names. 
 Tarskiǯs semantics rests on two related insights. One is that only some 
expressions receive absolute interpretations (relative to a model), while others 
require something additional, a sequence of individuals, to be interpreted.26 The 
                                                        
25 An infinite stock of variables and predicates can be specified by priming: ݔ′, ݔ′′, …, etc. After 
this initial presentation, we will allow context to determine the adicity of a predicate rather than 
by explicit indexing. 
26 Since this paper only concerns truth and not logical consequence we could in principle provide 
a fully absolute interpretation that does not relativize to a model.  The semantics of Tarski (1935) 
is absolute in this way, but in later work such as Tarski and Vaught (1956) the semantics is 
model-relative in the way we outline below. 
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other insight is that truth is displaced as the central notion of semantic theory in 
favor of satisfaction by a sequence, represented by the function ۤ … ۥ�.27 
 
To explain the notion of satisfaction Tarski begins with the notion of satisfaction 
by an object. An open sentence with one variable Ǯxǯ may be true or false relative 
to different assignments to Ǯxǯ. Thus, Ǯݔ ≤  ݔǯ may be true or false relative to each  
number, depending on whether the number is less than or equal to itself. 
 
Satisfaction becomes more complicated for formulae with multiple variables. Consider Ǯݔ ≤  ݕǯ. An assignment of ͵ to Ǯxǯ and ͹ to Ǯyǯ satisfies this formula, but 
the converse assignment does not satisfy this formula. In general, a formula may 
have an indefinite number of free variables. If a formula contains n free variables, 
one must speak of the formula as satisfied or not by n-ary sequences of objects.  
 
Further generalizing, Tarski (1935: 191) speaks of an ǲenumerationǳ of all the 
variables of the language ۃߙଵ, … , ߙ�, … ۄ .The variables in this enumeration may 
be jointly assigned to different sequences of objects. Let the set of these 
sequences of objects be as follows. 
 ‡ ۃߙଵ, … , ߙ�, … ۄ ‡  = {ۃ݀ଵ, … , ݀�, … ۄ: ݀ଵ, … , ݀� ∈ � ܽ݊݀ ߙ௞ = ߙ௝ → ݀௞ = ௝݀  } 
  
This presentation slightly differs from Tarskiǯs since we allow a variable to occur 
multiple times in an enumeration. The objects in the corresponding positions of 
the sequences that serve as values for the enumeration, however, must be 
identical.  
 
One can then define the satisfaction of an atomic open sentence such as Ǯݔ ≤  ݕǯ 
by a sequence � = ۃ͵, 7, ͵, 9, … ۄ in terms of whether the entities in the sequence 
(in positions corresponding to the variables in the enumeration) are in the 
                                                        
27 One often hears the remark that Tarski's semantics for first-order logic—in particular the 
treatment of variable-binding operators—isnǯt compositional ȋsee, e.g., Soames 2011: 129). 
Apparently, Tarksi himself made this remark to Barbara Partee (see Hodges 2013: § 2.1). But the 
semantics can easily be made compositional, if the semantic value of a variable is a function from 
sequences to individuals and the semantic value of a formula is a function from sequences to 
truth-values (see, e.g. Janessan 1997: § 2.4 and Rabern 2013: 395-397). 
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extension of the predicate Ǯ≤ǯ.  The recursive semantic clauses can be specified 
relative to a model ℳ = ۃ�, ܫۄ, where D is a domain of individuals and I is an 
interpretation function (which maps an n-ary predicate to a set of n-tuples 
drawn from D) as follows: 
 
 Variables:   If ߙ is a variable, then 
 ۤαۥ� = �ሺߙሻ 
Sentences:  If  is an n-ary predicate and ߙଵ, … ߙ� are variables, then 
 ۤ �ߙଵ … ߙ�ۥ� = ͳ  iff ۃۤߙଵۥ�, … , ۤߙ�ۥ�ۄ ∈ ܫሺ�ሻ 
If � and � are formulae and ߙ is a variable, then 
 ۤ� ר �ۥ� = ͳ  iff ۤ�ۥ� = ͳ and ۤ�ۥ� = ͳ 
 ۤ¬�ۥ� = ͳ  iff ۤ�ۥ� ≠ ͳ  
 ۤ∀ߙ�ۥ� = ͳ  iff  for every ݀ ∈ �, ۤ�ۥ�[ఈ/ௗ] = ͳ 
 ۤ∃ߙ�ۥ� = ͳ  iff  for some ݀ ∈ �, ۤ�ۥ�[ఈ/ௗ] = ͳ 
 
For any sequence �, variable ߙ, and ݀ ∈ �, let �ሺߙሻ = ݀ iff �௝ = ݀  and ߙ is the jth  
position of the enumeration ۃߙଵ, … , ߙ� … ۄ. To define ߙ-variant sequences let  �[ߙ/d] be the sequence � ∈ ‡ ۃߙଵ, … , ߙ�, … ۄ ‡   varying from �  at most such that �ሺߙሻ = ݀. 
 Some of Tarskiǯs remarks might suggest that he avoids the antinomy because he holds that ǲvariables do not possess any meaning by themselvesǳ ȋTarski ͳͻͶͳ: 
4), by which he means that, if variables had referents, then these referents would be ǲentities of such a kind we do not find in our world at allǳ ȋibid.).28 In 
particular, they do not refer to objects. Variables function in a more complicated 
way. They designate different individuals relative to different sequences. But, 
there is no absolute designation of the variable without supplementation by a 
sequence. 
  
 
3.2 Does Tarski escape the antinomy? 
                                                        
28 Specifically, Tarski says that a numerical variable would have to denote a variable number, 
which is neither positive, nor negative, nor zero. 
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Tarski has avoided positing referents or designata of the variables. But the antinomy concerns the ǲmeaningǳ of variables more generally: do variables 
agree in meaning? )n Fineǯs vocabulary, this is equivalent to asking whether they 
have the same semantic role.  In our reconstruction, this is equivalent to asking 
whether alphabetic variants express the same structured contents. This question 
may be posed without supposing that a variable refers. Fine formulates an 
objection to Tarskiǯs semantics, taking as a premise only that the semantic roles 
of Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ can be compared for same-ness or difference.  
 Yet, Tarskiǯs semantics doesnǯt directly speak to the ǲrolesǳ or ǲmeaningsǳ of Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ. It merely assigns values to these variables relative to sequences. That is, 
Tarski offers a semantic theory that assigns designata to variables relative to 
sequences. So although Tarski has avoided assigning absolute referents to 
variables, his account leaves open what they ǲmeanǳ. The crucial task then, is to extract a meaning of the variable from Tarskiǯs semantic theory which fulfills the 
desiderata above: distinct variables in the same sentence contribute differently to the sentenceǯs structured meaning but corresponding variables in alphabetic 
variants make the same contribution. 
 
Fine sees only two options. The first option is that the meaning of a variable is 
the range of values assigned to it by various sequences. That is, the meaning of Ǯxǯ 
is the class {݀: ∃�ۤݔۥ� =  ݀}, the domain of the variable. Analogously, the 
meaning of Ǯyǯ is the class {݀: ∃�ۤݕۥ� =  ݀}. The domains of Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ are the 
same, thus, Tarski can secure a sense in which Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ agree in semantic role. 
 
Yet, Fine (2007: 10) rejects this account on the grounds that it doesnǯt account for the difference between Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ.29 As we saw before, substituting an 
occurrence of Ǯxǯ for an occurrence of Ǯyǯ in a formula may result in a new formula 
                                                        
29 Strictly speaking, Fine objects that Tarski doesnǯt secure a semantic difference between pairs of variables Ǯxǯ, Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ, Ǯxǯ. This charge is a bit hard to interpret within the Tarskian framework, since Tarskiǯs theory offers no instruction for semantically evaluating pairs of variables. 
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with different satisfaction conditions. So merely assigning a domain to the 
variables does not capture their full semantic behavior.30  
 
Put in terms of structured meanings, treating the semantic contribution of a 
variable as its domain would force us to identify the structured meanings of 
sentences that should remain distinct.  This argument requires an assumption, 
which we will call structure intrinsicalism. 
 
Structure Intrinsicalism:  If two sentences have the same syntactic structure and  
       the corresponding terminal constituents of these    
       sentences all agree in meaning, then the sentences agree  
       in meaning.  
 
Structure intrinsicalism can be thought of as a manifestation of the principle of 
compositionality. Namely, the semantic values assigned to syntactically 
composite expressions are determined by the semantic values of their 
components and their mode of combination. So if there is a difference between 
structured meanings of two expressions, this must derive ultimately from a 
difference in structure or a difference in semantic values assigned to terminal nodes. We will revisit this assumption when we discuss Fineǯs own semantics. 
 Now consider the sentences Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ and Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݔǯ. These sentences are 
not synonymous and so should have different structured meanings. But if the 
relevant meaning assigned to a variable is its domain, then these two formulas 
are syntactically isomorphic and their corresponding terminal nodes all agree in 
meaning. As a result, the formulas themselves agree in structured meanings. If Ǯ∃ǯ, Ǯ∀ǯ, and Ǯ≤ǯ respectively contribute [∃], [∀], and [≤]  to the structured 
meanings of sentences that contain them, while variables Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ contribute 
their domain �, then the common structured meaning of Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ and Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݔǯ can be presented as follows: 
                                                        
30 This echoes (Church 1956: 9-10) who says: "Involved in the meaning of a variable...are the 
kinds of meaning which belong to a proper name of the range. But a variable must not be 
identified with a proper name of its range, since there are also differences of meaning between 
the two.ǳ  
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This identity of meaning is obviously unwanted. 
 
Fine offers another suggestion for extracting the meaning of a varaible from Tarskiǯs framework. (e suggests—in essence—looking at the contribution that a 
variable makes to formulae that contain it. In particular, the variable contributes 
an object relative to any input sequence. So the meaning of the variable could be 
construed as just this procedure for taking an input sequence and yielding an 
object that is the ǲvalueǳ of the variable. This procedure determines a function 
taking any sequence to the value of the variable relative to that sequence: �� �ሺݔሻ. One could frame the semantic theory as assigning this function to a 
variable as its absolute or sequence-invariant meaning: ۤݔۥ = �� �ሺݔሻ. This 
function is what we might call its ǲsemantic valueǳ, since it is sufficient to 
account for the full compositional behavior of a variable. 
 Fine ȋʹͲͲ͹: ͳͳȌ, however, objects that this construal leaves Tarski ǲunable to 
account for the fact that the semantic role of the variables x and y is the same in 
the cross-contextual case[.]ǳ Since distinct variables Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ have distinct 
semantic values, i.e. �� �ሺݔሻ ≠ �� �ሺݕሻ , the structured meaning approach discussed above will assign different structured meanings to Ǯ∀ݔܨݔǯ and Ǯ∀ݕܨݕǯ. 
But this violates the desideratum that alphabetic variants should have the same 
structured meanings. 
 
Nonetheless, one obvious thought is that the semantic role of a variable 
somehow combines both these aspects. The variable possesses a semantic value, 
and this distinguishes its meaning from other variables. Yet this semantic value 
determines a domain, which is common among many variables. Fine (2007: 11) reasons that this in unsatisfactory:  ǲWhat we have at best is a partial identity of 
semantic role, in that the range of the two variables is the same. But this is 
something that holds equally of the cross-contextual and intra-contextual cases.ǳ 
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Even though the diverse semantic values of Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ determine that they have a 
common feature—their domain—it nevertheless remains that these values are 
distinct. 
 
Framed in terms of structured meanings the problem is clear: Either the variables Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ will contribute something different to the structured 
meanings of sentences that contain them or they will not. If they contribute the 
same thing—say, their domains or gaps or what have you, then the account will 
over-generate synonyms.  If the variables contribute something different—say, 
themselves or numbers or their semantic values, then the account will 
distinguish the structured meanings of alphabetic variants. Neither result is 
desirable. Thus, it seems that the Tarskian approach to variables and 
quantification cannot meet the challenge posed by the antinomy. 
 
 
4. Fine’s anti-intrinsicalism 
 
Fine takes this to motivate a radical solution to the antinomy that involves distinguishing a variableǯs intrinsic from its extrinsic semantic features. On this 
view, the meaning of a variable in isolation cannot explain its semantic behavior. Fineǯs semantics is informally glossed for a small fragment of the language. We 
briefly develop its central aspects. 
 Fineǯs crucial move to avoid the antimony involves denying the plausible 
principle of intrinsicalism, the doctrine that the semantic behavior of a variable 
derives from its semantic role, understood as a semantic characterization of that 
variable in isolation from other expressions.  Indeed, even Fine (2007: 23) says 
this principle is ǲhard to disputeǳ. (is motivation for abandoning it is solely to 
resolve the antimony. 
 
 
4.ͷ Fineǯs semantics  
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Fine proposes to semantically evaluate a sentence or complex expression in 
terms of what values its parts may assume when taken in sequence. Thus, Fine would evaluate the sentence Ǯݔ + ݕ = ݕ + ݔǯ for truth or falsity in terms of what 
values the expressions composing the sequence ۃݔ, +, ݕ, =, ݕ, +, ݔۄ may assume 
when taken in that sequence.  
 Fineǯs (2007: 27) idea is that ǲdistinct variables take values independently of one 
another and that identical variables take the same value.ǳ )n our example, the 
sequence ۃݔ, +, ݕ, =, ݕ, +, ݔۄ may assume the value ۃ7, +, ͵, =, ͵, +,7ۄ, but not the 
value ۃ7, +, ͵, =, 5, +,5ۄ. Fine (2007: 25) calls the set of values that a sequence of 
expressions can assume the semantic connection of that sequence, ǲ[t]he aim of 
relational semantics...is to assign a semantic connection to each sequence of expressions.ǳ 
 We will use Ǯ‡ ⋯ ‡ǯ to denote the function that takes a sequence of expressions to 
its semantic connection, the range of values that the constituent expressions are 
capable of taking in that sequence.  A sequence consisting of a single variable ߙ is 
assigned to its domain, D. 
 
1-Membered Sequences:  ‡ ۃߙۄ ‡ = {݀: ݀ ∈ �} 
 
The semantic connection on an n-tuple of variables is meant to generalize the 
notion of a domain for a variable; it is ǲthe set of sequences of values that the 
[variables] are simultaneously capable of assumingǳ ȋFine ʹͲͲ͹: 27). 
 
2-Membered Sequences: ‡ ۃߙଵ, ߙଶۄ ‡ = {ۃ݀ଵ, ݀ଶۄ: ݀ଵ, ݀ଶ ∈ � ܽ݊݀ ߙଵ = ߙଶ → ݀ଵ = ݀ଶ } 
 
n-Membered Sequences:  ‡ ۃߙଵ, … , ߙ�ۄ ‡ = {ۃ݀ଵ, … , ݀�ۄ: ݀ଵ, … , ݀� ∈ � ܽ݊݀ ߙ௞ = ߙ௝ → ݀௞ = ௝݀  } 
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Since variables are the only elements that are coordinated in semantic 
connections, it will suffice to focus on them. 
 Fineǯs semantics derives the truth conditions of a formula � from the semantic 
connection on its expansion, which enumerates the primitive constituents of �. 
So the truth conditions of � will be specified as a function of the semantic 
connection on its expansion. It is worth noting that the recursive procedures are 
deeply non-compositional. This is partially because the sub-formulae will be 
evaluated relative to the semantic connection of the whole (see the discussion in 
Fine 2007: 26). But also, the procedure for evaluating a formula consisting of an 
operator and two sub-formulae such Ǯሺ� ר �ሻǯ in terms of these components will 
not proceed by evaluating each sub-formula in isolation, but in terms of its 
consequences for the whole.31  
 
 
4.͸ Fineǯs attempted resolution  
 
We can now ask Fine the question he (2007: 10) puts to Tarski: ǲwhat account, 
within the framework of the [Finean] semantics, can be given of the semantic role of the variablesǳ? At first pass, Fineǯs semantics, like Tarskiǯs, doesnǯt assign 
any semantic role to the variables. Fineǯs semantics doesnǯt traffic in ǲrolesǳ, but 
merely offers a list of sentences characterizing how a variable Ǯxǯ contributes to 
the semantic connection of an arbitrary sequence: ‡ ۃݔۄ ‡ = {ܽ: ܽ ∈ �} ; ‡ ۃݔ, ݕۄ ‡ = {ۃܽ, ܾۄ: ܽ, ܾ ∈ �}; ‡ ۃݔ, ݔۄ ‡ = {ۃܽ, ܽۄ: ܽ ∈ �}; and so on. This leaves open the question of how to extract semantic roles from Fineǯs semantics. 
 
                                                        
31 As a result, Fineǯs semantics requires a further twist in order to accommodate the semantics of 
variable binding: a coordination relation among variables. Though this aspect of Fineǯs 
semantics—the coordination scheme—has received the most attention, it ultimately plays little 
role in the resolution of the antinomy (see Pickel and Rabern ȋmanuscriptȌ ǲDoes semantic relationism solve Fregeǯs puzzle?,ǳ for discussion of the coordination schema with an explicit formalization of Fineǯs relational semantics for first-order logic).  
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Fine suggests that the semantic role of a variable, Ǯxǯ, is just the semantic 
connection on the sequence consisting of just that variable, ‡ ۃݔۄ ‡ = {ܽ: ܽ ∈ �}. 
Since  ‡ ۃݔۄ ‡ = {ܽ: ܽ ∈ �} = ‡ ۃݕۄ ‡, Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ have the same semantic roles. 
 But this does not explain the difference in behavior between Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ, since 
from their respective semantic roles one cannot derive that  ‡ ۃݔ, ݕۄ ‡  is {ۃܽ, ܾۄ: ܽ, ܾ ∈ �} while ‡ ۃݔ, ݔۄ ‡ is {< ܽ, ܽ >: ܽ ∈ �}, which is different. Thus, the 
semantic connections on pairs of variables are not determined by the semantic 
connections on those variables taken in isolation. 
 
Fine thinks this is as it should be. The semantic connections on ۃݔ, ݕۄ and ۃݔ, ݔۄ 
are primitive facts about these sequences. To insist on deriving claims about the 
semantic role of a pair of variables from the semantic roles of the variables 
themselves, Fine thinks, is to insist on the intrinsicalist doctrine, that there is ǲno 
difference in semantic relationship without a difference in semantic featureǳ 
(Fine 2007: 24). According to Fine, the behavior of a variable in a sequence of 
expressions is an extrinsic feature of that variable. And the extrinsic features of 
variables need not derive from the semantic roles of the variables themselves. 
 
Fine insists that ǲin asserting that the semantic role of x and y is the same, we 
only wish to assert that their intrinsic semantic features are the sameǳ ȋFine 
2007: 22). The difference in semantic roles between the pairs ۃݔ, ݕۄ and ۃݔ, ݔۄ are 
intrinsic features of these pairs, but extrinsic features of the variables 
themselves. Thus, Fine believes he has secured the difference in semantic role 
between these sequences. As he says, 
[The relational semantics] embodies a solution to the antinomy: the 
intrinsic semantic features of x and y (as given by the degenerate 
semantic connections on those variables) are the same, though the 
intrinsic semantic features of the pairs x, y and x, x (again, as given by the 
semantic connections on those pairs) are different (Fine 2007: 31-2). 
 This is Fineǯs attempted resolution of the antinomy.32 
                                                        
32 King (2007: 218-222) also abandons intrinsicalism, since he thinks that Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ contribute the same ǲthingǳ to structured contents, namely nothing, while ǮFxyǯ and ǮFxxǯ nevertheless 
express different structured contents. Salmon (2007: 121, footnote 14) likewise gives up 
intrinsicalism by assigning a semantic role to an occurrence of Ǯxǯ in isolation that cannot be used 
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We have re-interpreted Fineǯs requirement that two variables have the same 
semantic role as the claim that sentences that are alphabetic variants should 
have the same structured meanings. Fine can achieve this, since he can think that 
a variable contributes its domain to the structured meaning of a sentence that 
contains it. Of course, this move mimics the first option that Fine offers Tarski, 
according to which the semantic role of a variable is its domain. The difficulty for 
Tarski, recall, was that this proposal identifies the structured meanings of sentences such as Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ and Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݔǯ since these sentences have the 
same structure and their terminal nodes have the same ǲmeaningsǳ. 
 Fineǯs position, however, is not susceptible to this criticism since he denies 
intrinsicalism. (e denies that the ǲmeaningǳ of a whole follows from the meaning of the parts and their arrangement. So, Fine may say that Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ and Ǯ ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݔ ǯ have different structured meanings, because they have 
corresponding constituents with different meanings. )n particular, Ǯݔ ≤  ݕǯ and Ǯݔ ≤  ݔǯ are corresponding constituents of Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ and Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݔǯ, 
respectively. Fine denies that Ǯݔ ≤  ݕǯ and Ǯݔ ≤  ݔǯ have the same ǲmeaningǳ, even 
though their ultimate constituents have the same meaning. (In the following 
structured meanings we explicitly display the semantic connection on an 
expression immediately below the expressionǯs node in the tree.) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              to predict the behavior of Ǯxǯ in other contexts. Salmonǯs approach makes use of complicated type-shifting rules, which he assimilates to Fregeǯs ǲindirect referenceǳ. Likewise Kellenberg (2010: 
231) seemingly gives up the project of deriving the semantic role of a sentence from the semantic roles of the expressions it contains: ǲ...it is a mistake to think that the difference in semantic role between Ǯx > yǯ and Ǯx > xǯ must be due to a difference in semantic role between the pairs of 
variable types (Ǯxǯ, ǮyǯȌ and ȋǮxǯ, Ǯxǯ)... Rather, the expression types Ǯx > yǯ and Ǯx > xǯ have different 
semantic roles because the former contains occurrences of two variable types, whereas the latter 
contains occurrences of only one variable type, although one that occurs twice." Yet, Kellenberg 
maintains that heǯs an intrinsicalist. 
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On the other hand, Fine may say that all corresponding constituents of alphabetic 
variants such as  Ǯ∀ݔܨݔǯ and Ǯ∀ݕܨݕǯ agree in meaning: 
 
 
 Thus, Fineǯs denial of intrinsicalism may also be taken as a denial of what we call 
structure intrinsicalism: composite expressions with the same syntactic structure may have distinct ǲmeaningsǳ even though their corresponding constituent 
expressions agree in meaning. 
 
 
5. The Tarskian resolution 
 
Our puzzle is that Ǯxǯ cannot be substituted for Ǯyǯ in Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ, yielding Ǯ ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݔ ǯ, without change of meaning. Yet, alphabetic variants are completely synonymous and so must have the same structured meanings. Fineǯs 
resolution to this puzzle involves denying both intrinsicalism and, more 
generally, compositionality. 
 )n order to respect intrinsicalism, the semantic axioms governing variables Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ must assign them to distinct semantic values.  )n Tarskiǯs explicit 
semantics the variables are ordered in a context-invariant way. The semantic 
value of the nth variable in the ordering is a function that takes a sequence to the 
nth position in the sequence. We represent that ordering as a function mapping 
variables into numbers. Let ܿ be a function from the set of variables {ݔ, ݕ, ݖ, … } to 
the set of natural numbers ℕ. Then Tarski can be viewed as assigning the following ǲmeaningsǳ to Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ given the ordering function c: 
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ۤݔۥ = �� �௖ሺ௫ሻ ۤݕۥ = �� �௖ሺ௬ሻ On this semantics, Ǯݔǯ and Ǯݕǯ are assigned to different objects, since they occupy 
different positions in the ordering and so ܿሺݔሻ ≠ ܿሺݕሻ. The variables do have 
their domains in common. Yet, as we have seen, the domain is not a suitable 
candidate to secure the semantic sameness between Ǯݔǯ and Ǯݕǯ.  
 
In assigning different semantic values to the variables Ǯݔǯ and Ǯݕǯ, Tarski—and his 
followers in standard formal semantics—seem unable to account for the fact that 
alphabetic variants are synonymous. Moreover, the context invariant 
enumeration is—as Tarski (1935: 191, note 1) himself admits—ǲpurely technicalǳ.  Related approaches popular in formal semantics such as Heim and 
Kratzer (1998: §5.3.3) likewise face this difficulty, since they simply lexicalize 
the semantic difference between variables. Indeed, Heim (1982: 166) proposes 
to identify the objects playing the roles of variables ȋǲdiscourse referentsǳȌ 
simply with numbers. 
 
But Tarski is sensitive to these challenges. He suggests that a less stipulative 
enumeration of the variables could be given in terms of the order of the variables 
in a formula. 
[We could number all the variables of every given expression] on the 
basis of the natural order in which they follow one another in the 
expression: the sign standing on the extreme left could be called the first, 
the next the second, and so on. In this way we could again set up a certain 
correlation between the free variables of a given function and the terms of 
the sequence. This correlation…would obviously vary with the form of the 
function in question. (Tarski 1935: 191, note 1) 
 
Tarski is proposing that we replace the stipulative, and pre-established, 
enumeration of the variables—whereby e.g. ݔ is associated with the 1st member 
of a sequence and ݕ is associated with the 2nd, etc.—with an enumeration c that 
is sensitive to the formula being evaluated. In particular, Tarski proposes that if Ǯݔǯ is the nth variable in a formula, then Ǯݔǯ will be associated with the nth position 
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in a sequence. Tarskiǯs brief suggestion, we claim, contains the resources needed 
to resolve the antinomy.33 
 
On this proposal, each position in any sentence � induces a context ܿ which 
associates the variables in � with positions in sequences. Namely, the value of the variable Ǯxǯ for an input sequence will be the object in the ܿሺݔሻ�ℎ position of 
that sequence. If sentences � and �∗ are alphabetic variants and Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ occupy corresponding positions, then Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ will be associated with positions 
in sequences by ܿ and ܿ∗ so that ܿሺݔሻ = ܿ∗ሺݕሻ and so �� �௖ሺ௫ሻ = �� �௖∗ሺ௬ሻ. Thus, Ǯxǯ in the context induced by its position in the sentence Ǯ∀ݔܨݔǯ will have the same semantic value as Ǯyǯ in the context induced by Ǯ∀ݕܨݕǯ.  
 
Structured meanings should be specified in terms of the context-saturated 
meanings of the variables not in terms of the context-unsaturated meanings. In practical terms, this means that if a variable Ǯxǯ in sentence � is to be evaluated at 
context c, then the Ǯxǯ will contribute its semantic value at c, namely �� �௖ሺ௫ሻ.  This is analogous to Kaplanǯs (1989a) idea that the belief content of a sentence is 
given by its content (context-saturated meaning) and not its character (context-
unsaturated meaning), though with a crucial difference, since our discourse 
contexts evolve as the sentence is processed.34 
 
                                                        
33 The semantic axioms for the variables Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ can now be written as ۤݔۥ = �ܿ�� �௖ሺ௫ሻ and ۤݕۥ = �ܿ�� �௖ሺ௬ሻ. This has an interesting pay-off. Although according to the semantics ۤݔۥ ≠ ۤݕۥ, 
it nonetheless assigns them a common semantic property, namely �ߙ ሺۤߙۥ = �ܿ�� �௖ሺఈሻሻ. If one thinks of the ǲsemantic roleǳ of an expression as its ǲrepresentational functionǳ, then it is natural 
to think of the semantic role of an expression as the property attributed to it by its canonical axiom in the semantic theory. )t follows that these two semantic axioms deliver the result that Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ have the same semantic roles. 
34 Kaplan (1989a) proposes two layers of meaning for an expression, the character and the content. These two layers of meaning play different roles in Kaplanǯs semantic theory: the 
content is the information asserted in a particular context, whereas, the character of an 
expression encodes what content the expressions would have in any context. If in context c, A says to B Ǯ) am hungryǯ and, in c*, B says to A ǮYou are hungryǯ, then they have said the same thing 
relative to their respective contexts. We likewise propose two layers of meaning, one captures 
how the value of a variable depends on the discourse context, and the other captures the information value of the variable relative to a discourse context. Variables Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ have 
different context-unsaturated meanings, but in the context of alphabetic variants, such as ∀ݔܨݔ 
and ∀ݕܨݕ, their ǲcontentǳ is the same. 
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We will provide recursive procedures specifying the truth conditions and the 
structured meaning of each sentence. Given this semantics, alphabetic variants 
will have the same structured meanings. On the other hand, if Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ occur in a 
single sentence �, then they will be evaluated at contexts c and c* such that ܿሺݔሻ ≠ ܿ∗ሺݕሻ and so �� �௖ሺ௫ሻ ≠ �� �௖∗ሺ௬ሻ.  As a result, Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ will have different 
semantic contents in the contexts induced by their respective positions in Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ. As a result, replacing Ǯyǯ by Ǯxǯ, yielding Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݔǯ, will not 
preserve meaning. This, in essence, resolves the antinomy of the variable. 
 
But significant explanatory burdens remain. First, we must explain how to 
evaluate a variable in a context. We must then explain the formal procedure by 
which the context evolves as a sentence is processed. As Fine (2007: 8) remarks, the appeal to contexts ǲdoes not really solve the puzzle but merely pushes it back a step.ǳ (e asks, ǲwhy do we say that the variables x and y have a different semantic role inǳ Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ? Our answer is that the difference in meaning of Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ in Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ can be explained by a theory describing the evolution 
of the enumeration in a sentence. This same theory will predict that 
corresponding variables in alphabetic variants have the same meaning in their 
respective contexts. 
 
 
5.1 The evolution of context 
 )n order to implement Tarskiǯs idea compositionally, we assess a variable against 
a sequence of individuals �, and also a discourse context c, which enumerates the 
variables. ۤݔۥ = �ܿ�� �௖ሺ௫ሻ ۤݕۥ = �ܿ�� �௖ሺ௬ሻ 
Following Tarski (1935) we assume that each sequence of individuals � is of 
infinite length.35 Effectively a sequence � maps numbers onto objects in the 
                                                        
35 Tarski (1935: 195, footnote 1) also considers the possibility of employing finite sequences.  
Dekker (1994) develops the idea in a different direction more in line with the proposal in the 
 33 
domain. )n Tarksiǯs semantics every variable has a value relative to a sequence 
because Tarski stipulates an initial, static mapping c from variables to numbers. The value of a variable Ǯxǯ relative to a sequence �  and the stipulated 
enumeration c is �௖ሺ௫ሻ. 
 
By way of contrast in our semantics the initial discourse context c—the initial 
mapping from variables to numbers—does not associate any variables with 
numbers. There is no pre-established ordering of the variables. Rather the 
enumeration is determined dynamically as a sentence is processed—newly 
introduced variables are associated with new positions in sequences. 36  The relevant context will be supplied by the variableǯs position in the sentence (as we 
explain below). Collectively, the discourse context and the sequence define an 
assignment function on the variables in the sentence.37 
  
 
We can then assign a structured meaning to a sentence by assessing the semantic 
values of its constituents at the context induced by their position in the sentence. 
 On the resulting semantic theory, the variables Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ contribute functions 
from sequences into objects to the structured meanings of sentences that contain 
                                                                                                                                                              
text. A formula is initially evaluated against a finite or null sequence, which grows as quantifiers 
are processed. This idea could easily be integrated into the proposal of the text. 
36 Our approach integrates ideas from (eimǯs ȋͳͻͺʹȌ file-change semantics and Vermeulenǯs 
(2000) model of variables as stacks.  Pickel (2015: §5.3) also hints at this strategy. 
37 Strictly speaking, c, will be a relation, not a function, since a context might evolve by adding multiple indices to Ǯxǯ, e.g. {ۃݔ, ͳۄ, ۃݔ, ʹۄ}, as in the formula Ǯ∃ݔ∃ݔܨݔǯ. But since it is only the highest 
index that will matter we now define ܿሺߙሻ as the highest n such that there is a variable ߙ and ۃߙ, ݊ۄ ∈ ܿ.  
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them. These functions are in no way typographic. They lie purely on the ǲnon-conventional sideǳ of language.38 
 
How are variables introduced into discourse? Since we focus on the semantics of 
first-order logic, we assume that they are introduced by quantifiers. A quantifier Ǯ∃ݔǯ attached to a formula � is processed first by updating the context so that Ǯxǯ 
is assigned to a new position in the sequence and then by evaluating � with 
respect to this new context.  
 
In our model, we need to keep track of the highest number assigned to a variable 
in discourse context c. Represent this by ܰݑ݉ሺܿሻ = ܯܽݔሺ{݊: ∃ߙ ۃߙ, ݊ۄ ∈ ܿ}ሻ. The 
basic idea, then, is that one evaluates a quantified formula ∃ݔ� relative to c by 
evaluating its sub-formula, �, relative to the extension of c that assigns Ǯxǯ to the 
next position in a sequence, to ܰݑ݉ሺܿሻ + ͳ.  
 
Variables: If ߙ is a variable, then 
 ۤߙۥ = �ܿ�� �௖ሺఈሻ 
Sentences:  If � is an n-ary predicate and ߙଵ, … ߙ� are variables, then 
 ۤ�ߙଵ, … , ߙ�ۥ௖,� = ͳ   iff ۃۤߙଵۥሺܿ, �ሻ, … , ۤߙ�ۥሺܿ, �ሻۄ ∈ ܫሺ�ሻ 
If � and � are formulae and ߙ is a variable, then 
 ۤ¬�ۥ௖,� = ͳ   iff ۤ�ۥ௖,� ≠ ͳ 
 ۤ� ר �ۥ௖,� = ͳ   iff ۤ�ۥ௖,� = ͳ and ۤ�ۥ௖,� = ͳ 
 ۤ∀ߙ�ۥ௖,� = ͳ   iff for all ݀ ∈ �, ۤ�ۥ௖∗,�[௖∗ሺఈሻ/ௗ] = ͳ,  
where ܿ∗ = ܿ ∪ {ۃߙ, ܰݑ݉ሺܿሻ + ͳۄ} 
 
 ۤ∃ߙ�ۥ௖,� = ͳ   iff for some ݀ ∈ �, ۤ�ۥ௖∗,�[௖∗ሺఈሻ/ௗ] = ͳ,  
where ܿ∗ = ܿ ∪ {ۃߙ, ܰݑ݉ሺܿሻ + ͳۄ} 
                                                        
38 See Fine (2007: 11). There may be a residual worry about absolute or context-unsaturated 
semantic value of the variable. In particular, contexts are modeled as functions from variables 
into the natural numbers, representing positions in sequences. So the domain of this function 
may include linguistic items. The worry is that the very appeal to such functions makes the 
semantics objectionably typographic on the grounds that it has to ǲincorporate the variables themselves […] into the very identity ofǳ their semantic values (Fine 2007: 32). We find this worry misguided. We donǯt see how the appeal to such a set could be objectionably typographic. 
There is nothing objectionable about the claim that the semantic role of a predicate is to map 
entities to truth-values. But many predicates will map themselves to a truth-value ȋe.g. Ǯis a predicateǯ). For us, a context is just a set, that may include ordered pairs of variables and 
numbers. Perhaps the worry is that the set will have the variables themselves in its transitive 
closure. But this will also be true of the extensions of many predicates.  
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On our semantics, a formula is evaluated against two parameters, a discourse 
context c and a sequence of individuals �. We can think of the closed formulae of 
our language as regimenting sentences of natural language. As Tarski observed in 
defining truth relative to satisfaction only, if a closed formula is satisfied by one 
sequence, then it will be satisfied by any sequence. This led him to define truth 
for a sentence in terms of satisfaction by every sequence. We similarly observe 
that, for a closed formula � and context c, if ۤ�ۥሺܿ, �ሻ = ͳ, then ۤ�ۥሺܿ∗, �ሻ = ͳ 
for any ܿ∗. This leads us to a slightly different definition of truth simpliciter than 
might be offered on the Tarskian model. For us, a sentence � will be true 
simpliciter if ۤ�ۥሺܿ, �ሻ = ͳ for the empty discourse context ܿ = ∅ and every 
sequence �. In particular, we find it more natural to think of a sentence as 
evaluated at an empty discourse context, which evolves as the formula is 
processed.39  
 Unlike Fineǯs semantics, this semantics is strongly compositional insofar as if ۤߙۥ = ۤߚۥ  and �ఈ  differs from �ఉ  only in that ߙ  is substituted for ߚ , then ۤ�ఈۥ = ⟦�ఉ⟧.  The only plausible candidates for failures of substitution—and the 
only expressions sensitive to the dynamic enumeration—are variables. But for 
any variables ߙ and ߚ, if ۤߙۥ = ۤߚۥ, then ߙ = ߚ. This just reflects the fact that the 
context-invariant semantic values of any two variables differ.40 
 
                                                        
39 We do not mean to foreclose the possibility of treating open formulae as representing 
sentences of natural language as well, such as those containing demonstrative or anaphoric 
pronouns (Partee 1984/2004: 170-1). Doing so, of course, would require that truth be identified 
with satisfaction, not by every sequence, but by some contextually salient sequence or sequences. 
40 Some ways of construing compositionality are more demanding. They might require for 
instance that every expression is provided a semantic value, and that the semantic value of every 
complex expression is determined by the semantic values of its immediate constituents and their 
mode of combination. The semantics offered here is syncategorematic in the case of sentential 
connectives, since we havenǯt assigned them semantic values in isolation but have only provided 
truth-conditions for constructions that contain them. But we could easily extract a non-
syncategorematic semantics for instance the semantic value of the existential quantifier can be 
provided as follows: ۤ∃ߙۥ =  �݌. �ܿ��. ∃݀ ݌ሺܿ∗, �[ܿ∗ሺߙሻ/݀]ሻ  = ͳ , where ܿ∗ = ܿ ∪ {ۃߙ, ܰݑ݉ሺܿሻ +ͳۄ}. (In the preceding lexical entry the variables ݌, ܿ, �, ݀ are meant to be of designated semantic 
types as follows: ݌ ranges over functions from discourse contexts and sequences of individuals to 
{0,1}; ܿ ranges over discourse contexts; � ranges over sequences of individuals drawn from the 
domain; and ݀ ranges over individuals in the domain �.) 
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Nonetheless, the semantic value of distinct variables ߙ and ߚ may nonetheless 
coincide in their appropriate respective discourse contexts. In particular, the variable Ǯxǯ in Ǯ∀ݔܨݔǯ has the same context saturated meaning as Ǯyǯ in Ǯ∀ݕܨݕǯ. )n 
evaluating each sentence relative to the null context, one must evaluate the sub-formulas Ǯܨݔǯ and Ǯܨݕǯ relative to an updated context in each case. One evaluates Ǯܨݔǯ in an updated context c* such that ܿ∗ሺݔሻ = ͳ. Similarly, one evaluates Ǯܨݕǯ in 
an updated context c** such that ܿ∗∗ሺݕሻ = ͳ.  Thus, both variables have the same 
meanings in context: ۤݔۥሺܿ∗ሻ = ۤݕۥሺܿ∗∗ሻ = �� �ଵ. We will use the meanings in 
contexts to define structured meanings. On the other hand, consider the 
variables Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ in the open sentence Ǯݔ ≤  ݕǯ embedded in  Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ. 
These variables will be assessed relative to a single context c such that ܿሺݔሻ = ͳ 
and ܿሺݕሻ = ʹ. As a result, Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ will have different context sensitive meanings 
in this sentence: namely ۤݔۥሺܿሻ = �� �ଵ ≠ ۤݕۥሺܿሻ = �� �ଶ. 
 
 
5.2 Structured meanings 
 
We have now given a truth conditional semantics. We now show how the 
structured meanings for formulae can be read off the semantic values of their 
constituents in contexts. We recursively assign structured meanings to every 
sentence � of the first-order language at any context c, written [�]௖ . (Let ܰݑ݉ሺܿሻ  =  ܯܽݔሺ{݊ ∶  ∃ߚ ۦߚ, ݊ۧ  ∈  ܿ}ሻ. And, let ܿ +  ߙ =  ܿ ∪ {ۦߙ, ܰݑ݉ሺܿሻ + ͳۧ}. 
For any logical connective ߛ ∈  {¬,ר, ∀, ∃} let its contribution [ߛ] be its semantic 
value.) 
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This procedure recursively specifies a structured meaning for every sentence of 
the language of first-order logic in terms of the semantic values of the basic 
constituents of the sentence. 
 
Moreover, the structured meanings are appropriate in that the semantics 
delivers the same structured meanings to pre-theoretically synonymous 
sentences and distinct structured meanings for sentences that are not 
synonymous, in the sense of expressing distinct belief contents. Return to our problematic pairs: Ǯ∀ݔܨݔǯ and Ǯ∀ݕܨݕǯ should have the same structured meanings while Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ and Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݔǯ should have distinct structured meanings. 
 
This result is delivered by our semantics. The structured meanings of Ǯ∀ݔܨݔǯ and Ǯ∀ݕܨݕǯ will be the same, namely: 
 )n their respective formulas, Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ are evaluated at contexts that assign them 
to the same function from sequences into objects. 
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On the other hand, the variables Ǯxǯ and Ǯyǯ in Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ will be associated 
with different functions from sequences to objects. They will thereby make 
different truth conditional contributions which will figure into the structured 
meaning of this sentence, namely: 
 As desired, the structured meaning of Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ is different from the structured meaning of Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݔǯ, namely: 
 As a result we have resolved our puzzle.  The variable Ǯxǯ cannot be substituted for Ǯyǯ in Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݕǯ, yielding Ǯ∃ݕ∀ݔ ݔ ≤  ݔǯ, without change of meaning. Yet, 
alphabetic variants are completely synonymous and so must have the same 
structured meanings. 
 
Finally, our view preserves intrinsicalism in two senses. First, weǯve assigned 
distinct semantic values to distinct variables. These semantic values predict the truth conditional contribution of a variable Ǯxǯ in a sentential context c, namely ۤݔۥሺܿሻ. The truth conditional contribution of the variable in a sentential context 
corresponds to its value in the structured meaning assigned to that sentence. 
Second, the truth conditional contributions of complex expressions and 
sentences in wider contexts—and thus their contributions to the structured 
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meanings of sentences that contain them—are a function of the truth conditional 
contributions of their components in context. It is for this reason that the 
structured meaning of a sentence can be described in terms of the semantic 
contributions of its terminal nodes. We donǯt need to assign emergent semantic 
contributions to non-terminal nodes, as do anti-intrinsicalists such as Fine 
(2007) and King (2007). Thus, our Tarskian resolution to the antinomy 
preserves intrinsicalism.41 
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